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<국문 요약>
Abstract
In this paper, we examine the relationship between credit ratings, credit ratings changes and earnings management. 
Since the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, many listed firms collapsed, leading investors to suffer losses. As a result, 
credit ratings have become a very important indicators of firms’ financial stability for investors, government agencies
and debt issuers and other stakeholders. 
Firms with a similar credit rating are grouped together as firms of similar credit quality (Kisgen 2006) because 
credit ratings provide an ‘economically meaningful role’ (Boot et al. 2006). Numerous studies find that managers care 
deeply about their credit ratings (Graham and Harvey 2001; Kisgen 2009; Hovakimian at al. 2009). Firms that borrow 
equity in  the form of bonds may have incentives to increase credit ratings with opportunistic earnings management. 
A change in a firm’s credit ratings has a direct impact on a firm’s profitability. Firm’s benefit from better terms from 
suppliers, enjoy better investment opportunities and have lower cost of capital when their credit risk is lower. Firms
incur a higher cost of debt and experience additional costs when their credit risk is higher. American studies find that
firms use earnings management to influence credit ratings (Ali and Zhang 2008; Jung et al. 2013; Alissa et al 2013).
Credit  rating agencies have stated they assume financial statements to be reasonable and accurate (Securities and 
Exchange Commission, 2003; Standard and Poor’s, 2006) and they do not consider themselves to be auditors. They 
take the information in the financial statements as accurate. Therefore, there is a potential for managers to engage in
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earnings management to influence credit ratings. In South Korea, there have been numerous experiments with auditor
legislation because of financial collapses due to earnings management in the 2000s. Therefore, a decomposition of the
relation between opportunistic earnings management and credit ratings is an important consideration for Korean 
accounting academia. 
Previous Korean studies have examined whether credit ratings in period t are significantly related to level of 
earnings management in the same period; however, those studies fail to find the consistent results. It is widely known
that credit rating agencies allow one year credit watch period to assess default risk before credit rating decision. Firms
with an incentive to increase their credit ratings through earnings management will only realize if earnings 
management positively influences credit ratings in the following year. Therefore, we focus on establishing a 
relationship between the levels of earnings management at time t and credit ratings / changes at time t+1. Our study 
provides a more robust analysis by establishing if both accrual based and real earnings management in period t 
influences credit ratings and credit rating changes in period t+1.
Using a sample of 1,717 Korean KRX firm-years from 2002 to 2013, we find a negative relation between earnings
management in period t and credit ratings in period t+1, suggesting that firms with higher credit ratings have lower
levels of earnings management. Moreover, we find that firms that experience a credit ratings change in period t+1 are
less likely to engage  in opportunistic earnings management in period t, suggesting that firms do not have the potential 
to increase credit ratings. We also find that firms that experience a credit rating increase in period t+1 have a negative
association with opportunistic earnings management for accruals measures. Moreover, when we split our sample into 
firms that experience 1) a credit rating increase, 2) decrease and 3) remaining the same, we find that firms that 
engage in earnings management are more likely to remain unchanged or experience a credit rating decrease. Thus, 
taken together, we find no evidence of relationship between opportunistic earnings management and an increase in 
credit ratings in the South Korean public debt market. Our results may be of interest to regulators, credit rating 
agencies, market participants and firms that question whether level of earnings management in current year influences 
credit ratings in the subsequent period.
Keywords : Credit Ratings, Accrual Based Earnings Management, Rear Earnings Management, Default 
Risk, Credit Risk
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Ⅰ. Introduction
Credit rating agencies provide a useful appraisal 
of credit risk for investors, government agencies and 
debt issuers because firms with similar credit ratings 
are considered as having similar credit quality. A 
change in a firm’s credit ratings has a direct impact 
on a firm’s profitability. Firm’s benefit from better 
terms from suppliers, enjoy better investment 
opportunities and have lower cost of capital when 
their credit risk is lower. Firms incur a higher cost 
of debt and experience additional costs when their 
credit risk is higher. Therefore, there is a potential 
that management may be motivated to take action to 
influence their credit ratings. Numerous studies find 
that firms use earnings management to influence 
credit ratings (Ali and Zhang 2008; Jung et al. 2013; 
Alissa et al 2013). In South Korea, there is mixed 
evidence about the relation between credit ratings 
and managerial opportunism. The majority of studies 
are based on models that suggest that earnings 
management in period t influence credit rating in 
period t. However, former Korean studies ignore the 
time lag between credit rating analysis and credit 
rating change suggested by Alissa et al. 2013. Firms 
that potentially face a credit rating change must 
experience a 1 year credit watch period; therefore, 
earnings management in period t is more likely to 
influence credit ratings in period t+1. Our paper is 
motivated by this caveat.
We use a sample of KRX firms that borrow 
public equity in the from of bonds from 2002 to 
2013 to test the relationship between earnings 
management in period t, and its effect on credit 
ratings in period t+1. For our analysis, we use the 
residual from the Dechow  et al. (1995) and Kothari 
et al. (2005) as proxies for accrual earnings 
management (AEM henceforth). Moreover, we use 
two proxies for real earnings management (REM 
henceforth). The REM models suggested by Cohen 
and Zarwin (2010) are a combination of the 
cashflow from operations, production cost and 
discretionary expense models suggested by 
Roychowdhury (2006). In all of our models, earnings 
management is our variable of interest.
First, we use ordered probit regression with credit 
rating in period t+1 as the dependent variable. We 
find a negative relation between credit ratings in 
period t+1 and earnings management in period t, 
suggesting that firms with higher credit ratings are 
less likely to engage in earnings management; 
moreover firms are not likely to increase credit 
ratings with opportunistic earnings management. 
Secondly, we perform multivariate OLS regression 
to establish if earnings management in period t 
influences credit ratings in period t+1. The results 
suggest that accrual based EM measures have 
significant negative association with credit rating 
changes, suggesting that firms with higher level of 
discretionary accruals are less/likely to experience a 
credit rating change/downgrade. However, the results 
for REM are not significant, suggesting REM have 
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a limited effect on credit rating changes. Thus, we 
infer that credit ratings agencies are concerned with 
accruals based earnings management, but do not 
separate abnormal real earnings management from 
operating activities.
Thirdly, we test the relation between credit ratings 
increases in period t+1 and earnings management in 
period t. We find a negative relation between 
earnings management in period t and credit ratings 
increases in period t+1 using logistic regression. The 
results suggest a negative relation between 
managerial opportunism and credit ratings increases. 
Moreover, we compare the earnings management of 
firms that have experienced a credit rating increase, 
decrease and firms with unchanged credit ratings 
using logistic regression. We find that firms that 
engage in earnings management are more likely to  
experience a credit rating decrease or remain 
unchanged. Finally, we perform a truncated 
regression for robustness because OLS estimates can 
be considered biased. Our Maximum Likelihood 
estimates are consistent with the results from our 
main analysis. Therefore, we find that opportunistic 
earnings management in period t is not associated 
with a credit rating increase in period t+1. Thus, we 
infer that credit rating agencies have the capability 
of capturing the level of earnings management 
during the credit watch period.
Although some studies previously examined the 
relation between earnings management and credit 
ratings, our study contributes to the literature by 
establishing the relation in several distinctive 
manners. First, we focus on levels of earnings 
management during the credit watch period, period 
t to period t+1. Firms care deeply about credit 
ratings and have incentives to manage credit ratings. 
Credit rating agencies issue a 1 year credit watch 
period before determining credit ratings changes. 
Whilst other studies find a relation between earnings 
management at time t and credit ratings at time t, 
our model tests if firms that engage in earnings 
management can improve credit ratings in period 
t+1. Second, we consider both accrual based and real 
earnings management metrics to establish a relation 
between EM and credit ratings in period t+1. 
Previous studies find that effective monitoring 
agencies are capable of capturing AEM whilst REM 
is hard to detect. We test whether credit rating 
agencies can capture both AEM and REM during the 
credit watch period concurrently. Third, we take a 
battery of approach, specifically using ordered probit 
regression for the credit ratting continuous variable 
at time+1, OLS regression for credit rating 
difference between time t and t+1, and logistic 
regression for the credit rating change dummy 
variable. Fourth, we run a series of tests to examine 
whether level of earnings management are 
significantly related with credit rating increases, no 
change and decreases after partitioning our sample 
into 3 sub-samples. Finally, we partition our accrual 
based earnings management measure into 
income-increasing /decreasing accruals and find that 
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only income-increasing accruals are significantly 
related to credit ratings at time+1. Thus, our analysis 
can be considered as the most robust analysis of 
relation between opportunistic earnings management 
and credit ratings changes. We find no evidence of 
a relationship between opportunistic earnings 
management and an increase in credit ratings in the 
South Korean public debt market. Our results may 
be of interest to regulatory agencies, market 
participants, and other various stockholders who 
question whether level of earnings management 
influence credit ratings in the subsequent period.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. 
In the next section, we provide a review of relevant 
literature and develop hypotheses. In section III, we 
will explain the research design and the earnings 
management metrics. Section IV will present details 
of the results; section V discusses the results of 
additional analysis. Finally, section VI concludes.
II. Previous Studies and 
hypothesis
In South Korea, credit ratings are primarily issued 
by Korea’s four credit rating agencies, National 
Information & Credit Evaluation (NICE) Korea 
Investor Services (KIS), Korea Ratings (KR) and 
Seoul Credit Rating & Information (SCI). Standard 
and Poor’s (2006) define credit risk as the possibility 
that a bond issuer will default by failing to make 
principal and interest payments under the bond’s 
terms. Credit risk is defined by Moody’s Investor 
Service (2009) as a relatively expected loss rate, 
which is the product of expected default rates and 
expected loss-severity rates in the case of default. 
Generally, there are ten categories AAA, AA, A, 
BBB, BB, B, CCC, CC, C, D; each category from 
AA to CCC is divided into subcategories with +/-. 
Each company may use a different symbol to the 
above; however, as a rule, the ordinal level is 
constant for all credit ratings firms. Credit ratings 
increases and decreases occur when a firm’s credit 
risk increases or decreases.
Firms consider their credit rating when making 
decisions about equity capital. Graham and Harvey 
(2001) collect survey evidence from CFOs in the 
U.S. and Canada; they find that a firm’s primary 
concerns when issuing debt, are financial flexibility 
and credit rating. Graham et al. (2005) conduct 
survey evidence; they find that 78% of managers 
would take economic actions that could have 
negative long-term consequences to manage earnings 
to meet benchmarks. Studies suggest that firms take 
credit ratings into account when making capital 
allocation decisions. Kisgen (2009) finds that in the 
year following a downgrade, firms issue less debt to 
regain a credit rating following a credit rating 
downgrade to avoid further downgrades. Hovakimian 
at al. (2009) examine how firms target their credit 
ratings and how the ratings targets influence 
corporate decisions; their research suggests that 
firms engineer their financial structure to achieve 
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their credit rating targets at the lowest possible cost 
of capital. Thus, the literature suggests that credit 
rating levels are an important consideration for 
managers, ceteris paribus managers prefer higher 
credit ratings.
Firms with a similar credit rating are grouped 
together as firms of similar credit quality (Kisgen 
2006). Boot et al. (2006) argue that credit ratings 
provide an ‘economically meaningful role’ by 
facilitating equilibrium in bond investment. A firm’s 
credit rating can provide an independent appraisal to 
the market regarding the default risk associated with 
a firm’s debt. Whilst ratings agencies provide 
information about a firm’s probability of default risk, 
rating agencies have stated they assume financial 
statements to be reasonable and accurate (Securities 
and Exchange Commission, 2003; Standard and 
Poor’s, 2006). Therefore, given that credit rating 
agencies do not consider themselves to be auditors. 
They take the information in the financial statements 
as accurate. Therefore, managers may have an 
opportunity to improve their credit ratings by 
engaging in earnings management.
Hokakimain et al.(2009)'s research based on 
capital structure empirically test the relation between 
credit rating and how ratings targets influence 
corporate decisions. They find evidence that supports 
the idea that firms make corporate finance choices 
that offset shocks that move them away from their 
target capital structures. 
Accounting research has focused on agency 
theory between managers and equity holders.  
Dechow and Dichev (2002) and Kothari et al. (2005) 
demonstrate that organizations are opportunistic in 
managing earnings to meet earnings benchmarks. 
However, whilst there is extensive research on the 
earnings management in the private debt market, 
there is limited evidence about the relation between 
earnings management in the public debt market.
Borrowing from Hovakimain et al.‘s (2009) capital 
structure model, Alissa et al. (2013) suggest that firms 
are able to influence their credit ratings after engaging 
in earnings management using abnormal accruals and 
real earnings management. Alissa et al. (2013) find 
that firms utilize both types of earnings management 
techniques in successfully moving upward or 
downward towards its ‘predicted’ credit rating; 
Moreover, the level of earnings management is higher 
for BBB+ at the investment grade cut off level. Jung 
et al. (2013) test if firms within broad rating 
categories (AA) have differential incentives to 
smooth earnings compared to firms at the top or 
bottom of a rating category (AA+ or AA-,). They find 
evidence that ‘top firms’ (AA+) use higher levels of 
discretionary accruals techniques to smooth reported 
income compared to bottom (AA-) rated firms. Ali 
and Zhang (2008) also find evidence that firms 
engage in earnings management to influence their 
capital structure to influence credit ratings.
Firms are likely to use a mix of abnormal accruals 
and real earnings management as tools to manage 
their reported earnings(Kim et al., 2013; Park, 2012). 
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Gunny (2010)  finds that firms who employ REM 
to meet the benchmarks have higher subsequent firm 
performance compared to firms that do not engage 
in REM and miss / just beat earnings benchmarks. 
Alteratively, the firm may choose between the two 
earnings management mechanisms using the 
technique that is less costly to them. Real earnings 
management (REM) is defined as management 
actions that deviate from normal business practices 
undertaken for purposes of achieving certain 
earnings thresholds (Roychowdhury, 2006). Gunny 
(2010) examines the relation between REM and 
ex-post performance. Gunny (2010) finds evidence 
that REM is associated with firms just meeting 
earnings benchmarks. Zang (2012) finds that the 
trade-off between the two earnings management 
methods is a function of their relative costs. Crabtree 
et al. (2014) evaluates new debt offerings and 
evaluates if real earnings management influences the 
bond rating and actual price of a new firms rating. 
They find the relationship between REM to bond 
price and rating to be negative. However, numerous 
studies find a positive relation between real earnings 
management and credit ratings levels (Ali and Zh 
ang 2008; Alissa et al. 2013).
Whilst the majority of US studies find a negative 
relation between opportunistic earnings management 
at notch levels and around the investment grade 
level, evidence from South Korea is mixed. Oh 
(2005) finds that level of discretionary accruals have 
a positive association with level of credit ratings. 
Ahn and Kim (2014) find that credit ratings levels 
have a significantly positive correlation with 
abnormal CFO/abnormal production cost but have 
negative correlation with abnormal discretionary 
expenses. On the other hand, Park and Roh (2011) 
find that firms with lower credit ratings (hence 
higher default risk) engage in earnings management 
in the subsequent period. 
Park et al. (2012) find that firms with higher level 
of accrual based and real earnings management are 
likely to experience a credit rating decrease in period 
t+1, using credit ratings for corporation(Not credit 
ratings for bonds). Lee and Kim(2011) find that 
REM have negative association with credit ratings, 
suggesting that credit rating agencies capture level of 
real earnings management. Lee and Jung (2012) find 
that level of REM has a negative relation with credit 
ratings. Moreover, firms that experience a credit 
rating downgrade, engage in more REM, compared 
to firms that do not experience a credit rating 
change. We hypothesize, based on the U.S. literature 
that firms with higher credit ratings are more likely 
to have lower level of earnings management due to 
the fact that there are less incentives and higher 
repetitional costs for firms with higher credit ratings 
to influence future credit ratings changes. Therefore, 
we develop the following hypothesis. 
H1: Earnings management is negatively 
associated with credit rating levels.
A report by the FTSE, London's stock exchange 
suggests that although Korea has yet to fully satisfy 
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a small minority of detailed criteria, in all essential 
respects, meets the definitions and standards of a 
developed market (Woods, 2013). Moreover, whist 
the Korean economy is comparable to those of most 
developed countries, its legal enforcement is weak 
(La Porta et al. 1997). However, because of 
numerous instances of window dressing causing 
financial collapses in the early 2000s, South Korean 
legislators have experimented with numerous audit 
policies to increase confidence in the South Korean 
economy. Therefore, the different results observed in 
South Korean may be explained by different 
legislative policies. 
Our research is designed to the most robust 
analysis of earnings management and credit ratings 
by establishing a relation between CR in period t+1 
and earnings management in period t, following the 
model established in <Figure 1>. 
Credit ratings agencies predict credit ratings 1 
year in advance dependent on financial data and 
corporate governance data. Firms care deeply about 
credit ratings and have incentives to manage credit 
ratings. The manager of firms  under a credit watch 
period have incentives to engage in earnings 
management to influence credit ratings in the 
subsequent period. Previous studies find a relation 
between earnings management at time t and credit 
ratings at time t. However, previous studies do not 
consider that a time lag, firm characteristics in 
period t and level of earnings management may not 
influence credit rating change in the same period. 
Our research is designed to capture whether firms 
that engage in earnings management have the 
potential to improve their credit ratings at time t+1. 
A firm with a higher level of earnings management 
has the potential to benefit from an increase in credit 
ratings. On the other hand, CR agencies may 
interpret increased earnings management as 
<Figure 1> Incentives for earnings management to influence credit ratings
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opportunistic behaviour and penalize earnings 
management. Firms that experience a credit rating 
decrease, face an increase in borrowing cost, are 
more likely to receive institutional investment; hence 
may endure larger economic loss. Therefore, based 
on the above, we develop the following hypotheses:
H2: Firms that engage in earnings management 
increase/decrease their credit ratings.
III. Research Design
3.1 Model specifications and 
variables descriptions
Accrual based earnings management
We measure abnormal accruals using the residual 
from the modified Jones model suggested by 
Dechow (1995) as a proxy for earnings management. 
 is Net income – cashflow from operations. 
   , is total assets in period t-1. ∆ is 
changes in sales, calculated at sales in period t minus 
sales in period t-1. ∆, changes in accounts 
receivables is calculated as the changes in accounts 
receivable in period t and period t-1. PPE is 
property, plant and equipment.
Modified Jones Model (Dechow et al., 1995)
       
 ∆ ∆    
   
(1)
Where,
 : Total accruals (=Net income – cashflow 
from operations)
   : Total Assets at time t-1
∆ : Changes in sales (=   )
∆ : Changes in accounts receivables 
(=  )
 : Property, Plant, Equipment
In addition, we use the performance adusted 
model, suggested by Kothari et al. (2005). We 
include an additional variable,    in equation 
(1) since Kothrai et al. (2005) suggest that the 
variable has the potential to decrease potential 
measurement error. All other variables are defined 
perviously. 
Performance Adjusted Model (Kothari et al., 
2005)
        
 ∆ ∆    
      
(2)
Where,
   : Return on assets at time t-1
Real earnings management
Our real earnings management proxies are based 
on Roychowdhury’s model (2006). We identify three 
levels of abnormal ‘real activities’; abnormal levels 
of cash flow from operations (CFO) in equation 3, 
production costs (Prod) in equation 4 and 
discretionary expenses (SGA) in equation 5. 
Deviations from normal levels of real activities are 
considered to be real earnings management (the 
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residual from one of the three estimation models). 
Positive deviations would be interpreted as earnings 
management for production costs (Prod). A negative 
deviation would be interpreted as management 
making upward earnings management decisions 
based on CFO and discretionary expenses (SGA). 
We multiply –1 by abnormal SGA and abnormal 
CFO to facilitate the interpretation.
Real Earnings Management Models
       
   ∆
   
  (3)
Pr       
   ∆
   ∆     
(4)
       
      (5)
Where,
 : Cashflow from operation at time t
 : Production cost at time t (=Cost of sales 
+ Changes in inventory)
 : Sales and general administration expenses 
(=General administration expenses – 
taxes – depreciation expenses – rent 
expenses – insurance expenses) + (sales 
expenses + research and development 
expenses)
 : Sales revenue at time t
∆ : Changes in sales revenue at time t
CFO represents Cash flow from operations in 
period t scaled by assets in period t-1. Prod, 
Production cost at time t is calculated as cost of 
sales plus changes in inventory scaled with assets in 
t-1. SGA, sales and general administration expenses, 
are calculated as the variable definition above. 
  is revenue at time t and ∆  is changes 
in sales revenue at time t. 
In order to capture the total effects of REM 
activities, we combine the three individual measures 
to calculate two comprehensive metrics of REM 
activities(Cohen and Zarowin, 2010)2). The values 
from equations 3, 4 and 5 are added into equations 
6 and 7.
Total REM measures (Cohen and Zarowin, 
2010)
TRM1:  (6)
TRM2:      (7)
where,
 : Abnormal CFO calculated from the 
equation (3)
 : Abnormal production cost calculated 
from the equation (4)
 : Abnormal discretionary expenses 
calculated from the equation (5)
The purpose of equation 8 is to establish if 
opportunistic behaviour proxied by credit rating in 
period t influences credit ratings in period t+1. Our 
dependent variable is defined previously as an 
ordinal level representing a firm’s credit rating. Our 
2) We do not combine   and , since the 
same activities that lead to high , also lead to 
high , hence double counting(Cohen and 
Zarowin, 2010).
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independent variable of interest, EM are numerous 
earnings management metrics calculated in equation 
1, 2, 6 and 7. A negative relation between credit 
ratings and EM would suggest that firms with lower 
credit ratings would have higher levels of earnings 
management; therefore, in equation 8, we expect EM 
to be negative.
The purpose of equation 9 is to establish if 
earnings management in period t has the potential to 
change credit ratings in period t+1. Changes is 
defined as CR in period t+1 minus credit ratings in 
period t. Whilst we predict a negative sign for 
equation 8, equation 9 has the potential to have 
positive or negative coefficients. Statistically 
significant positive EM coefficients would suggests 
that opportunistic earnings management has the 
potential to influence credit ratings. Negative or no 
relation would suggest that opportunistic earnings 
management does not influence credit ratings.  
Equation 10 captures the different levels of earnings 
management of firms that increase their credit 
ratings in period t+1. A positive EM coefficient 
suggests that firms that experience a credit rating 
increase have been able to increase their credit 
ratings in period t+1 through opportunistic 
behaviour. A negative, or no results suggests that 
firms are not able to use opportunistic behaviour to 
increase credit ratings. D_Changes is a dummy 
variable that takes a value of 1 if credit ratings 
increases from t to t+1, or 0 otherwise. 
Research Models
         
   

(8)
      
   

(9)
      
   
  
(10)
Where,
Dependent Variables
  : Credit ratings at time t+1
 : Changes in credit ratings (= 
  )
: Dummy variable that takes 1 if 
credit rating increased from t to 
t+1 period, 0 otherwise
Variables of Our Interest
 : ABMJ (=Abnormal accruals computed 
from the modified Jones model, 
suggested by Dechow et al.(1995)
 : ABKW (=Abnormal accruals computed 
from the performance adjusted 
model, suggested by Kothari et 
al.(2005)
 : TRM1 (=)
 : TRM2 =    )
Control Variables
 : Natural logarithm of total assets at 
time t-1
 : Debt ratio
 : Sales growth ratio
 : Return on assets
 : Cashflow from operation scaled by 
total outstanding shares
 : Dummy variable that takes 1 if a 
firm experienced loss at time t-1, 0 
otherwise
ID & YD : Industry & Year fixed effect
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Our EM variables are previously defined. Size, 
the natural logarithm of total assets at time t-1 is 
expected to be positive because larger firms tend to 
be more mature. Lev is a proxy for risk, firms with 
higher leverage tend to be riskier because any shock 
to the organization can have a dramatic effect on a 
firms future profitability, or even existence. 
Therefore lower leverage is expected to have a 
positive relation with credit rating.  Grw, growth is 
calculated as the growth ratio; the sign is not  
predicted. ROA, return on assets and CPS, cash 
flow from operations per share are proxies for 
performance, both are expected to be positive. Loss, 
is a dummy variable designed to capture financial 
loss. ID, industry effect and YD, year effect are 
included. 
3.2 Sample selection
All credit rating data is collected from TS2000 
and financial data is collected from FN guide. We 
select a sample period from 2002 to 2013. This 
sample period has been selected because financial 
performance of firms’ reporting is considered more 
robust after the Asian Financial Crisis (1997). 
<Table 1> illustrates our sample selection process. 
Our initial sample was 2,480, 739 post period firms 
were excluded, and an additional 24 firms with no 
financial data were excluded, leaving a total of 1,717 
observations.
CR, our main variable of interest represents the 
credit rating levels of all the firms that borrow equity 
through public debt in South Korea over our sample 
period 2002-2013. Credit ratings are collected from 
<Table 1> Audit fee sample selection by credit ratings
Panel A: Audit fee and CR sample from 2002-2013
Initial CR Sample 2,480
Excluding Post periods (739)
Potential Sample 1,741
Excluding firms with no financial data available (24)
Final Sample 1,717
Panel B: Sample selection by credit ratings
CR scores CR Obs CR sores CR Obs
17 AAA 87 8 BBB- 168
16 AA+ 69 7 BB+ 73
15 AA 80 6 BB 73
14 AA- 156 5 BB- 72
13 A+ 158 4 B+ 44
12 A 172 3 B 32
11 A- 193 2 B- 17
10 BBB+ 155 1 Below B- 32
9 BBB 136 Total 1,717
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KIS, KR, NICE and SCI. All four credit ratings 
agencies have different methods of calculating credit 
ratings on a calendar year basis. Therefore, we run 
a numerous mean-difference test, comparing all of the 
credit ratings issued by different credit ratings 
agencies. The results suggest that there is a 
statistically insignificant mean difference for all four 
credit rating agencies. Therefore the combination of 
<Table 2> Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlations
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Var Obs Mean(Med) Max(Min) S.D.
CR_t+1 1717 10.59(11) 17(1) 3.81
DAMJ 1717 0.00(0.00) 0.26(-0.28) 0.08
DAKW 1717 0.00(0.00) 0.20(-0.19) 0.07
TRM1 1717 -0.03(-0.02) 0.53(-0.90) 0.21
TRM2 1717 -0.02(-0.02) 0.41(-0.52) 0.14
Size 1717 20.71(20.62) 24.39(17.61) 1.61
Lev 1717 0.52(0.54) 0.93(0.08) 0.18
Grw 1717 0.08(0.07) 1.03(-0.71) 0.25
ROA 1717 0.03(0.03) 0.18(-0.32) 0.08
CPS 1717 5.63(1.93) 83.77(-11.76) 13.94
Loss 1717 0.15(0) 1(0) 0.36
Panel B: Pearson Correlation
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.
1. CR_t+1 1
2. DAMJ -0.06*** 1
3. DAKW -0.06** 0.81*** 1
4. TRM1 -0.21*** 0.06*** 0.13*** 1
5. TRM2 -0.23*** 0.32*** 0.45*** 0.85*** 1
6. Size 0.52*** 0.02 -0.06** -0.12*** -0.17*** 1
7. Lev -0.43*** 0.13*** 0.05** 0.14*** 0.16*** 0.02 1
8. Grw 0.03 0.09*** 0.08*** -0.04 -0.06*** 0.06** 0.04 1
9. ROA 0.38*** 0.38*** 0.02 -0.14*** -0.16*** 0.19*** -0.39*** 0.23*** 1
10. CPS 0.31*** -0.16*** -0.27*** -0.21*** -0.32*** 0.30*** -0.21*** 0.04* 0.19*** 1
11. Loss -0.32*** -0.26*** -0.04 0.07*** 0.09*** -0.11*** 0.32*** -0.20*** -0.65*** -0.16***
Note) ① Variable Definitions
  : Credit ratings at time t+1
DAMJ : Abnormal accruals computed from the modified Jones model, suggested by Dechow et al.(1995)
DAKW : Abnormal accruals computed from the performance adjusted model, suggested by Kothari et al.(2005)
TRM1 : 
TRM2 :     
 : Natural logarithm of total assets at time t-1
 : Debt ratio
 : Sales growth ratio+
 : Return on assets
 : Cashflow from operation scaled by total outstanding shares
 : Dummy variable that takes 1 if a firm experienced loss at time t-1, 0 otherwise
ID : Industry fixed effect
YD : Year fixed effect
Note) ② ***, **, * indicate significance level at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively.
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all the credit ratings for all four credit ratings agencies 
is a homeogenous group. We exclude the results for 
brevity. Thus, CR is a combination of the highest 
credit rating level for all four of the largest credit 
ratings firms in South Korea; KIS, KR, NICE and 
SCI. The credit ratings take an ordinal score from 
1 to 17. The value of 17 represents the highest credit 
ratings levels of KIS, KR, NICE and SCI in a  single 
calendar year, AAA. Other credit rating scores are 
coded with an ordinal score from 16(AA)+ to 2(B-). 
All firms below CCC+ are given an ordinal score of 
1. We base this approach on Alissa et al. (2013). The 
coding values are illustrated in <Table 1> which 
shows that the credit rating levels of firms are 
relatively normally distributed. 
IV. Empirical Results
4.1 Descriptive Statistics and 
Pearson Correlations
<Table 2> Panel A shows our descriptive statistics. 
The average levels of earnings management are close 
to zero. However, our results show a variation in our 
DAM J, DAKW, TRM1 and TRM2 variables. The 
average credit rating is 10.59, between the investment 
grade cut off point between BBB+ and A-. The 
number of loss firms over our sample period is 15%.
<Table 2> Panel B shows our Pearson Correlations. 
All EM measures are negatively correlated with credit 
ratings at time t+1, implying that firms do not increase 
credit ratings using by inflating earnings using EM 
as an opportunistic tool; moreover, firms with higher 
credit ratings have lower levels of earnings 
management. The correlations suggests that credit 
rating agencies may have the expertise to capture both 
AEM and REM. Size, ROA and CPS are significantly 
positively correlated with credit ratings at t+1, 
suggesting that firms that are bigger, better performing 
with more cashflow are likely to have better credit 
ratings in the subsequent period. On the other hand, 
Lev, Loss are significantly negatively correlated with 
credit ratings at time t+1, implying that firms that 
have higher default risk (higher debt ratio and had 
a loss at time t) are likely to have lower credit ratings 
at time t+1, consistent with previous findings. 
4.2 Multivariate Analysis results
<Table 3> illustrates the results of the ordered 
probit regression with credit rating in period t+1 as 
the dependent variable. The majority of our control 
variables accept for growth are statistically 
significant at the 1% level and show the correct sign. 
A positive relation between EM in period t and a 
credit rating in period t+1 would suggest that 
managers use earnings management to increase 
credit ratings in period t+1. Our results for both 
AEM show negative signs, with DAMJ showing 
statistically significant signs at the 1% level. Our 
REM proxies are negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Thus, our results suggest 
that there is a negative association between earnings 
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<Table 3> Ordered Probit Regression Analysis (DV: Credit Ratings in t+1 period)
Model : 
             
Sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
DAMJ - -0.81(-2.47)**
DAKW - -0.22(-0.59)
TRM1 - -0.57(-4.75)***
TRM2 - -0.71(-3.86)***
Size + 0.42(23.39)*** 0.42(23.33)*** 0.42(23.21)*** 0.42(23.10)***
Lev - -2.84(-17.55)*** -2.81(-17.49)*** -2.78(-17.18)*** -2.78(-17.16)***
Grw ? -0.14(-1.39) -0.14(-1.35) -0.15(-1.53) -0.16(-1.60)
ROA + 1.71(3.70)*** 1.36(3.10)*** 1.23(2.81)*** 1.26(2.87)***
CPS + 0.01(2.68)*** 0.01(3.11)*** 0.01(2.69)*** 0.01(2.37)**
Loss - -0.34(-3.82)*** -0.34(-3.77) -0.35(-3.93)*** -0.35(-3.92)***
ID Included Included Included Included
YD Included Included Included Included
Chi2 1232.97*** 1109.19*** 1131.40*** 1123.78***
Pseudo R2 0.1345 0.1210 0.1234 0.1226
Obs 1717 1717 1717 1717
<Table 4> Multivariate OLS Regression Analysis (DV: Change)
Model : 
           
Sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
DAMJ +/- -0.89(-1.97)**
DAKW +/- -0.67(-1.95)*
TRM1 +/- 0.33(1.25)
TRM2 +/- 0.22(0.85)
Size + -0.02(-0.85) -0.02(-0.85) -0.02(-0.75) -0.02(-0.79)
Lev - 0.02(0.08) 0.03(0.12) -0.01(-0.06) 0.00(0.02)
Grw ? 0.06(0.39) 0.06(0.47) 0.06(0.41) 0.06(0.41)
ROA + 2.19(3.46)*** 1.83(3.02)*** 1.88(3.12)*** 1.84(3.04)***
CPS + -0.00(-0.87) -0.00(-0.71) -0.00(-0.09) -0.00(-0.17)
Loss - -2.89(-2.30)** -0.29(-2.30)** -0.27(-2.18)** -0.27(-2.21)**
ID Included Included Included Included
YD Included Included Included Included
f value 6.58*** 6.25*** 6.58*-** 6.12***
R2 0.0263 0.0250 0.0262 0.0245
Obs 1717 1717 1717 1717
Note) ① Variable Definitions
 : Changes in credit ratings (=   )
For other variables, refer to <Table 1>
Note) ② ***, **, * indicate significance level at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively.
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management in period t and credit ratings in period 
t+1. Therefore, we find that firms with higher credit 
ratings are less likely to engage in earnings 
management. Moreover, we find evidence that firms 
may not have the potential to increase credit ratings 
using EM as an opportunistic tool. We infer that 
credit rating agencies have the capability of 
capturing the level of earnings management during 
the credit watch period (in time t period).
<Table 4> shows results of multivariate OLS 
regression. The dependent variable, Changes is a 
continuous variable, calculated by subtracting credit 
rating scores at time t from credit ratings at time t+1. 
The results suggest that accrual based EM measures 
have significant negative association with credit rating 
changes, suggesting that firms with higher level of 
discretionary accruals are less/likely to experience in 
a credit rating change/downgrade. We interpret that 
credit rating agencies effectively monitor the level of 
AEM and discount credit ratings for firm that 
opportunistically engage in earnings management. 
However, REM measures show insignificant signs 
when regressed with credit ratings changes, suggesting 
that REM has a limited effect on credit rating changes. 
We infer that credit rating agencies may not separate 
abnormal CFO/production cost/discretionary expenses, 
proxies of real earnings management or as part of 
a firm’s operational activities.
As an additional test, we replace TRM measures 
with abnormal CFO, abnormal production cost and 
<Table 5> Logistic Regression Analysis (Positive Change vs Non-Positive Change)
Model : 
             
Sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
DAMJ +/- -2.06(-2.37)**
DAKW +/- -2.01(-2.01)**
TRM1 +/- 0.43(1.37)
TRM2 +/- 0.19(0.40)
Size + 0.13(3.15)*** 0.13(3.17)*** 0.14(3.20)*** 0.13(3.15)***
Lev - 0.48(1.18) 0.49(1.24) 0.44(1.09) 0.48(1.18)
Grw ? -0.09(-0.34) -0.06(-0.22) -0.08(-0.32) -0.09(-0.34)
ROA + 3.71(2.74)*** 2.79(2.16)** 2.98(2.28)** 2.90(2.22)**
CPS + -0.01(-1.51) -0.01(-1.46) -0.00(-0.72) -0.00(-0.82)
Loss - -0.43(-1.64) -0.44(-1.68)* -0.39(-1.52) -0.41(-1.56)
ID Included Included Included Included
YD Included Included Included Included
Chi2 37.90*** 36.28*** 34.13*** 32.37***
Pseudo R2 0.0233 0.0223 0.0210 0.0199
Obs 1717 1717 1717 1717
Note) ①  Variable Definitions
: Dummy variable that takes 1 if credit rating increased from t to t+1 period, 0 otherwise
For other variables, refer to <Table 1>
Note) ② ***, **, * indicate significance level at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively.
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abnormal discretionary expenses as suggested by 
Roychowdhury (2006). The untabulated results 
suggest that non of the above REM proxies are 
significantly related with credit rating changes, 
consistent with the results in <table 4>.
IV. Additional Analysis
Firms that acquire equity in the form of bonds 
have incentives to increase their credit ratings. 
Therefore, managers have an incentives to engage in 
earnings management. In our primary additional 
analysis, we establish a relation between level of 
earnings management and a credit ratings changes. 
The results suggest that firms that engage in 
opportunistic earnings management are less lively to 
experience a credit rating change. In <Table 5>, we 
test whether firms can successfully  increase their 
credit ratings in the subsequent period by engaging 
earnings management during the credit watch period. 
Our results, suggest  that engaging in positive 
earnings management fail to increase their credit 
<Table 7> Truncated Regression Analysis (Positive DA vs Negative DA)
Model : 
             
Sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Pos_MJ +/- -4.85(-2.94)***
Pos_KW +/- -0.91(-2.45)**
Neg_MJ +/- 0.86(0.45)
Neg_KW +/- 2.95(1.27)
Size + 1.22(20.53)*** 1.23(20.03)*** 1.12(16.44)*** 1.12(17.07)***
Lev - -7.64(-13.65)*** -7.25(-12.13)*** -7.94(-12.44)*** -8.11(-13.45)***
Grw ? -0.26(-0.77) -0.33(-0.91) -0.53(-1.15) -0.38(-0.88)
ROA + 3.23(1.66)* 4.94(2.59)** 6.02(3.27)*** 4.19(2.48)**
CPS + 0.05(0.65) 0.02(2.65)*** 0.01(1.96)* 0.01(1.45)
Loss - -0.97(-2.58)** -0.87(-2.65)*** -0.88(-2.59)** -1.06(-2.82)***
ID Included Included Included Included
YD Included Included Included Included
Wald Chi2 785.51*** 747.38*** 779.19*** 795.42***
Obs 875 845 842 872
Note) ① Variable Definitions
  : Credit ratings at time t+1
Pos_MJ : Income-increasing abnormal accruals separated from the modified Jones model
Pos_KW : Income-increasing abnormal accruals separated from the performance adjusted model
Neg_MJ : Income-decreasing abnormal accruals separated from the modified Jones model
Neg_KW : Income-decreasing abnormal accruals separated from the performance adjusted model
For other variables, refer to <Table 1>
Note) ② ***, **, * indicate significance level at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively.
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ratings. We find a negative relation between AEM 
measures and credit rating upgrades at the 5% level, 
suggesting that firms with high level of earnings 
management are more likely to decrease their credit 
rating or remain at an unchanged level. Thus, REM 
metrics are found not to influence credit ratings 
increases. However, credit ratings have the potential 
to 1) increase, 2) remain unchanged or 3) decrease 
depending on the firm’s level of default risk. 
In our second additional analysis, we partition our 
sample into 3 sub-samples 1) positive change, 2) no 
change, and 3) negative change and compare one 
each change scenario using adummy variable 
approach. Our results suggest that AEM measures 
are significantly negatively related with D_Change 
for the positive vs negative and the positive vs no 
change model, suggesting that firms that engage in 
high level of AEM during the credit watch period, 
have a higher probability to experience a credit 
rating decrease or remain with unchanged credit 
ratings in the subsequent period, than experience a 
credit rating increase. None of REM measures are 
found significant for all models. 
<Table 7> illustrates the results of our truncated 
regression analysis. The purpose of our study is to 
find whether firms engage in earnings management 
to increase credit ratings. Firms have an incentive to 
use income-increasing accruals to increase their 
reported earnings to affect their credit ratings.
In our third additional analysis, we establish a 
relation between income-increasing / income- 
decreasing discretionary accruals and credit ratings at 
time t+1. Since past literatures report that the OLS 
estimates are generally biased when a sample is 
truncated, we estimate a ML(maximum likelihood) 
truncated regression(Greene, 2000; Myer et al., 2003; 
Chi et al., 2009). We find a significantly positive 
relation between income-increasing accruals and credit 
ratings in period t+1, suggesting that firms that may 
implement income-increasing accruals to influence 
credit ratings during the credit watch period, are likely 
to experience lower credit ratings, consistent with the 
previous findings. However, we find that 
income-decreasing accruals do not influence credit 
ratings at time t+1.
V. Conclusions
In the U.S., numerous studies have found a 
relation between opportunistic earnings management 
to influence credit ratings. In South Korea, studies 
have found mixed results. However, Korean studies 
have generally considered that the effect of earnings 
management in period t influences credit ratings in 
period t; thus, Korean studies ignore the influence of 
the credit watch period and the lag between the 
analysis of credit ratings in period t and credit 
ratings changes in period t+1. Our research offers a 
more robust model by including the credit ratings 
agency’s credit watch period. 
Our results suggest that there is a negative 
relation between credit ratings in period t+1 and real 
and accruals earnings management in period t, 
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suggesting that firms that engage in earnings 
management are less likely to experience credit 
ratings changes in future periods. Moreover, we find 
that firms with higher credit ratings are less likely 
to participate in earnings management. We establish 
a negative relation between opportunistic earnings 
management in period t and change in period t+1 for 
accrual earnings management and find no relation 
between REM and credit rating change. The results 
suggest that credit ratings agencies are more likely 
to experience a positive change credit ratings in 
period t+1 when earnings management is negative in 
period t. Moreover, using a dummy variable 
approach we test the difference between the levels 
of earnings management in period t for firms that 
increase their earnings management in the 
subsequent period. We find a negative relation 
between opportunistic earnings management and 
subsequent credit ratings increases. We further split 
our change sample into positive change, negative 
change and no change. We find that firms that firms 
that engage in high levels of AEM during the credit 
watch period, have a higher probability to experience 
a credit rating decrease or remain with unchanged 
credit ratings in the subsequent period, compared to 
firms  experience a credit rating increase. For 
robustness we conduct a regression using Maximum 
likelihood. The results are consistent with out main 
findings. Taken together, our results suggest that 
firms that engage in earnings management in period 
t do not experience a credit rating change in period 
t+1; rather, these firms are more likely to experience 
a rating decrease. 
However, our study might have some limitations. 
We focus on establishing a relationship between 
earnings management during the credit watch period 
and credit ratings/credit rating changes using 
abnormal accruals as proxies for earnings 
management. Although an extensive previous 
literature justify abnormal accruals as a plausible 
proxy, the proxy may yield potential econometric 
bias. Future studies may extend the literature by 
including additional lagged earnings management 
variables, and additional control variables to explain 
credit risk.
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국문요약
기업은 신용등급을 상향조정 시키기 위하여 이익을 조정하는가?: 
회사채를 발행한 한국 유가증권 상장기업을 중심으로
3)
말리 다피드*, 임형주**
본 연구는 회사채를 발행한 유가증권 상장기업들이 보고이익을 조정하여 신용등급을 향상 시키는지를 검증
한다. 1997년 외환위기 이후 수많은 기업들이 도산하였고 투자자들의 주식과 채권은 휴지조각이 된 바 있다. 
이후 신용등급은 시장참여자에게 있어 매우 중요한 지표로 인지되어 왔고 기업들은 이를 유지하거나 상향 조
정시키기 위하여 많은 노력을 투입하는 것으로 알려져 있다. 선행연구에서는 기업들의 이익조정행위와 신용등
급의 관련성을 고찰한 바 있으나 그 결과는 혼재되어 있다. 또 대부분의 선행연구에서는 당기 이익조정과 당기 
신용등급의 관련성에 초점을 맞춰왔다. 그러나 신용등급평가기관들은 기업의 신용등급을 결정하기 전에 1년간
의 신용감시대상기간(credit watch period)을 설정하여 채무불이행 위험을 판단하는데, 높은 신용등급을 유지하
거나 낮은 신용등급을 상향조정하려는 유인을 가진 기업들은 이 기간에 이익을 조정할 유인이 높을 것으로 판
단할 수 있다. 따라서 본 연구는 t연도 기업의 이익조정 수준과 t+1연도 신용등급의 변화에 초점을 맞춤으로써 
두 변수간의 명확한 관련성을 고찰하고자 하였다. 
본 연구는 2002년부터 2013년까지 국내 유가증권 상장기업 중 회사채를 발행한 1,717 기업-년을 대상으로 발
생액 및 실제이익조정 수준이 높은 기업들이 의도한대로 차기 신용등급을 상향 조정시키는지를 검증하였다. 
연구결과, 전반적인 당기 이익조정 수준은 차기 신용등급점수와 유의한 음(-)의 관련성을 가지는 것으로 나타
났다. 이는 신용등급이 높은 기업들은 전기에 이익조정을 많이 하지 않은 기업들로 설명할 수 있으며, 기업들
이 이익조정에 적극적으로 개입할 경우 신용평가기관들이 이를 탐지하고 패널티를 부여하는 것으로도 해석할 
수 있다. 또 신용등급의 변화(차기 신용등급점수 – 당기 신용등급점수)는 발생액을 통한 이익조정만 유의한 음
(-)의 관련성을 갖는 것으로 나타났다. 이는 신용등급이 상향조정 된 기업들의 경우 전기에 발생액을 통한 이익
조정을 적게 한 것을 의미한다. 추가분석에서는 본 연구 표본을 신용등급이 1) 상향조정, 2) 유지, 3) 하향조정
된 경우로 분류/종속변수로 설정하여 로지스틱 분석을 수행해 보았다. 연구결과, 이익조정을 많이 한 기업은 신
용등급이 하락하거나, 변화하지 않을 가능성이 상향조정될 가능성 보다 높은 것으로 나타났다. 또 재량적 발생
액을 이익상향조정과 하향조정으로 분류하여 분석한 경우에도 일관적인 결과가 관찰되었다.  본 연구의 결과
는 이익조정의 수준이 기업의 신용등급을 예측하는데 추가적인 정보를 제공하는 지표로써 활용될 수 있다는 
것을 발견했다는 점에서 의미가 있다.
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